Homo sapiens is the only species in which we observe extensive cooperation among large numbers of genetically unrelated individuals. Incompatible approaches to explaining cooperation among humans have been offered by sociologists, biologists, and economists. None is wholly successful. Each discipline, moreover, has ignored basic insights of the others. This paper explains cooperation by combining central contributions of these disciplines, developing a model of cultural evolution in which we use (a) the sociological concept of the internalization of norms to explain cultural transmission; (b) the biological concepts of vertical and oblique transmission to model the interaction of cultural and biological adaptation; and (c) the economic concepts of rational action and the replicator dynamic to model the interaction between self-interested and altruistic behavior.
Introduction
Homo sapiens is the only species in which we observe extensive cooperation among large numbers of genetically unrelated individuals. Incompatible approaches to explaining cooperation among humans have been offered by sociologists, biologists, and economists.
1 None is wholly successful. Each discipline, moreover, has ignored basic insights of the others. This paper explains cooperation by combining central contributions of these disciplines, developing a model of cultural evolution in which we use (a) the sociological concept of the internalization of norms to explain cultural transmission; (b) the biological concepts of vertical and oblique transmission to model the interaction of cultural and biological adaptation; and (c) the economic concepts of rational action and the replicator dynamic (imitating the successful) to model the interaction between self-interested and altruistic behavior.
Individuals often do better by coordinating and sharing the benefits of their activities rather than each acting alone. The benefit accruing to the group from each individual's cooperation in such cases is greater than the cost to the individual, but nonetheless, each individual would be better off not incurring the costs of cooperation, and simply benefitting from the efforts of the other group members. If all participants follow this self-interested logic, however, cooperation will fail. When it is maintained, cooperation is altruistic, in the sense of being group-beneficial but personally costly. Why are such altruistic behaviors not driven out by self-interested agents? This is the puzzle of prosociality.
The distinctive contribution of sociological theory to solving the puzzle of prosociality is the insight that altruism is possible if, and to the extent that, the norm of contributing to the group and punishing noncontributors is acted upon by a sufficiently large fraction of social participants. Indeed, a key tenet of socialization theory is that a society's values are passed from generation to generation through the internalization of norms (Durkheim 1951 , Benedict 1934 , Mead 1963 , Parsons 1967 , Grusec and Kuczynski 1997 . In the language of rational choice theory, internalized norms are accepted not as instruments towards and constraints upon achieving other ends, but rather as arguments in the preference function that the individual maximizes.
2 A variety of prosocial emotions then come into play, including prominently shame, guilt, and empathy, directly biasing individual choices in prosocial directions.
The human capacity to internalize norms, which consists in an older generation instilling the values and objectives of a younger generation through an extended series of personal interactions, relying on a complex interplay of affect and authority, is based on a distinctive psychological predisposition. This capacity is not recognized in biology and economics.
Economic theory takes preferences (and hence culture) as exogenously given, and its default condition is that individuals are self-regarding, acting to maximize their personal payoffs from participating in social situations. Economists summarily reject the suggestion that one could solve the puzzle of prosociality by positing that "cooperating with others" is an argument in agents' preference functions. Yet this is precisely the position taken in this paper.
The biological literature admits the endogeneity of culture (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981 , Bonner 1984 , Boyd and Richerson 1985 , but treats culture as con-ventional (e.g., what side of the road to drive on, what vocalization is associated with what state of affairs, what rituals one performs when a relative dies, what foods one may and may not eat) or informational (e.g., how one best tills a certain type of land, how one best wards off disease), rather than fundamentally normative (how we should behave, in principle). To explain cultural transmission, biological models generally assume that recipients either directly perceive the utility of the conventions or information passed to them, or find it prudent to accept the opinions of informed others rather than engage in innumerable costly personal experiments in deciding which behavior has higher payoff (Conlisk 1988, Henrich and Boyd 2001) . Since altruistic norms are generally neither conventional nor informational, biologists have no explanation for the transmission of altruistic norms.
The distinctive contribution of biology to solving the puzzle of prosociality is the development of evolutionary models of cultural transmission by analogy with population biology and epidemiology (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985) , using quantitative mathematical constructs involving vertical transmission (from parents to children) oblique transmission (through socialization institutions, including secular and religious rituals, schools, and communications media), and horizontal transmission (from peer interactions).
The distinctive contribution of economics to understanding cooperation is the treatment of agents as maximizing a preference function subject to available actions. Sociologists have widely rejected this model, probably because it conflicts fundamentally with socialization theory, which sociologists do, but economists do not, consider to be empirically well-supported. Like economists, biologists have maintained that the theory of self-interested rational choice, properly applied, can explain all important aspects of human behavior (Williams 1966 , Dawkins 1976 , Alexander 1987 . This paper presents an evolutionary game theoretic model of altruism in which vertical and oblique cultural transmission are justified in terms of the internalization of norms, thus allowing altruistic as well as conventional and informational norms to be transmitted. We also assume individuals behave rationally by abandoning norms when they find alternatives that provide higher payoffs (the replicator dynamic). This corrects the "oversocialized" concept of the individual that is found in some prominent versions of socialization theory (Wrong 1961 , Gintis 1975 .
For analytical specificity, this paper studies the dynamics of a single altruistic norm that has a payoff disadvantage for those who adopt it, but is transmitted vertically by parents and obliquely through socialization institutions. We allow altruism to be either beneficial or harmful to the group, and we admit four types of cultural change.
have fewer offspring (biologically adaptive dynamics).
• Families pass on their cultural traits, self-interested or altruistic, to their offspring (vertical transmission) through internalization.
• A fraction of self-interested offspring are induced to adopt altruistic norms by socialization institutions (oblique transmission).
• Some of the resulting population change their cultural values to conform to the behavior of other individuals who have higher payoffs (replicator dynamics).
This model can be extended trivially to the case of many cultural norms, as long as their costs and benefits are additive. Where there are nonlinear interactions among norms, a more subtle analysis will be needed.
The following are examples of cultural forms that are altruistic in the above sense, and to which our analysis applies:
• Altruistic Cooperation. Personally costly behavior that benefits others in the group. This includes being trustworthy, being a fearless warrior, strenuously hunting game that will be shared equally among all group members, cooperating in team production, and not overexploiting a common pool resource. In a more modern setting, classical altruism includes willingness to vote and otherwise participate in the political life of the community, giving anonymously to charity, honestly paying taxes, acting on behalf of one's ethnic, racial, or religious group, and identifying with the goals of an organization of which one is a member.
• Altruistic Punishment. Punishing individuals who violate a social norm at a cost to oneself.
• Ritualistic Practices. Engaging in fitness-reducing rituals and practices when fitness-neutral or fitness-enhancing alternatives are available.
• Harmful Beliefs. Reacting to illness, death, crop failure, and other payoffreducing events by adopting defective explanations and ineffective remedies when fitness-neutral or fitness-enhancing alternatives are available.
The first two of these are strongly prosocial in that they enhance the fitness of other group members (positive altruism), whereas the last two are antisocial (negative altruism). Thus the maintenance of altruistic norms can be either fitness enhancing or fitness reducing for the group as a whole. In fact, most altruistic norms promulgated in most successful societies are prosocial (Brown 1991) , but negatively altruistic norms are not difficult to find (Edgerton 1992) . In the remainder of this paper, 'altruism' will refer to 'positive altruism' unless explicitly stated otherwise. Our model yields two general conclusions.
• In the absence of oblique transmission of the altruistic norm, altruism is driven out by self-interested behavior. When oblique transmission of altruism is present, a positive frequency of altruism can persist in cultural equilibrium.
• A high level of cooperation can be sustained in cultural equilibrium by the presence of a minority of agents who adopt the altruistic norm of what we call strong reciprocity: cooperating unconditionally and punishing defectors at a personal cost, the remaining agent being self-interested. 
The Prerequisites of a Model of Human Cooperation
The model developed below (a) does not assume agents are self-interested; (b) does not derive cooperative behavior from repeated interactions; and (c) does not depend on genetic group selection. The admission of non-self-interested behavior is based on empirical evidence, as presented in Section 3. We assume one-shot interactions because in many real-life situations people cooperate even when repetition is unlikely, as in such collective actions as mass demonstrations for civil liberties, democracy, and racial or gender equality, and because the experimental evidence demonstrates that people regularly cooperate even in anonymous, one-shot situations (Section 3). Moreover, it has proven difficult to develop a plausible model of cooperation in large groups using repetition alone. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and others have shown that repetition alone is sufficient in two-person groups, provided agents are sufficiently future-oriented. However, their argument does not extend to larger groups (Boyd and Richerson 1988) . One can generate Nash equilibria with high levels of cooperation in large groups if agents are sufficiently far-sighted (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986 ), but such equilibria have very poor dynamic stability properties, and depend on agents being implausibly far-sighted and patient (Gintis 2000a) . Second, in the primitive conditions under which human sociality evolved, when a group was threatened with extinction or dispersal, say through war, pestilence, or famine, cooperation was most needed for survival. But since the probability that the group will dissolve increases sharply under such conditions, cooperation based on future reciprocation cannot be maintained. Thus, precisely when a group is most in need of prosocial behavior, cooperation based on repeated interactions will collapse. Such critical periods were probably common in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens.
3 Gintis (2000b) shows that a small number of strong reciprocators, who punish defectors without regard for future reward, can dramatically improve the survival chances of human groups. An argument using the tools of population biology (specifically, Price's equation) then shows that under these conditions, strong reciprocators can invade a population of self-interested types, and can persist in equilibrium, thus stabilizing cooperation in large groups (Gintis 2000b) .
By positing that individuals internalize norms, we derive altruistic behavior without requiring inter-group competition of the sort need by group selection models.
4 This is desirable because biologists have shown that genetic group selection is very difficult to sustain unless genetic relatedness among group members is very high (Hamilton 1963 , Boorman and Levitt 1980 , Maynard Smith 1998 .
5
In a related paper, Gintis (2003) shows that a gene-culture coevolutionary model can account for the evolutionary stability of genes for internalization. 6 Moreover, a cultural group selection argument is needed to explain why norms are generally prosocial: competition among social groups will strongly favor those whose cultural systems are dominated by prosocial norms (Parsons 1964, Boyd and Richerson 3 Population contractions were likely common in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens (Boone and Kessler 1999) . The very low rate of growth of the human population over the whole prehistoric period, plus the high rate of human population growth in even poor contemporary foraging societies in good times (Keckler 1997) , suggests periodic crises occurred in the past. Moreover, flattened mortality profiles of prehistoric skeletal populations indicate population crashes ranging from 10% to 54% at a mean rate of once per thirty years (Keckler 1997) . Finally, optimal foraging models of hunter-gatherer societies often predict limit cycles (Belovsky 1988) . 4 We provide experimental evidence for norm internalization in Section 3.3. 5 In the biological literature group selection applied to a trait has tended to mean that the trait suffers a within-group fitness deficit, but nevertheless grows in the population because groups in which the trait is prevalent outcompete other groups in which the trait has low frequency (Wilson 1980) . There is a weaker sense of group selection, in which a trait is associated with, or facilitates, a certain group structure and groups with this structure outcompete groups without the structure, but the selected trait does not have a within-group fitness disadvantage. The biological critiques of group selection do not apply to this weaker notion. Our model is a group selection model in this weaker, uncontroversial, sense.
6 There is little doubt but that humans have prosocial human genes. We know, for instance, that brain structures in the prefontal lobes are required for normal sociality (Damasio 1994, Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda and . Moreover, sociopathy is somewhat heritable (Mealey 1995) . Finally, some types of prosocial behavior, especially revenge-seeking impulses, are counterindicated in many cultural systems (e.g., the Judeo-Christian), though these altruistic behaviors are nevertheless quite common, indicated that they are expressed even when they are not formally taught.
1990, Soltis 1995, Gintis 2003) .
Strong Reciprocity: The Behavioral Evidence
There are many civic-minded acts that are difficult to explain by self-interest. These include voting, giving anonymously to charity, participating in collective actions, and sacrificing oneself in battle. More mundanely, victims of crime often spend time and energy ensuring that the perpetrators are apprehended and receive harsh sentences, and jilted lovers retaliate at great personal cost. In modeling these behaviors, a suggestive body of evidence points to a schema that may be termed strong reciprocity (Gintis 2000a) . A strong reciprocator comes to a new social situation with a predisposition to cooperate, is predisposed to respond to cooperative behavior on the part of others by maintaining or increasing his level of cooperation, and responds to free-riding behavior on the part of others by retaliating against the offenders, even at a cost to himself, and even when he cannot not reasonably expect future personal gains from such retaliation. The strong reciprocator is thus both a conditionally altruistic cooperator and a conditionally altruistic punisher. We call this call this "strong" reciprocity to distinguish it from reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) , indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987, Nowak and Sigmund 1998) , and other forms of reciprocity that require repeated interactions and are can be explained using models of self-interested behavior (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) .
Observations of reciprocal behavior in everyday life are insufficient grounds for accepting strong reciprocity as a model of human behavior, however, because (a) anonymity is rarely achieved (for instance, even ostensibly anonymous charity donations are known to, or could be discovered by, family members); (b) subjects could believe their actions were part of a set of repeated interactions; and (c) we have no reliable measure of the frequency of what appear to be strongly reciprocal acts. These defects can be remedied by observing human behavior in an experimental game-theoretic setting. Several examples follow. In all cases, the subjects are anonymous, the payoffs are in real money, subjects are not misled by experimenters, and unless otherwise noted, interactions are one-shot rather than repeated.
Strong Reciprocity in and Experimental Labor Market
The experimenters (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997 ) divided a group of 141 subjects (college students who had agreed to participate in order to earn money) in to a set of "employers" and a set of "employees. The employer then offers a "contract" specifying a wage w and a desired amount of effort e * . A contract is made with the first employee who agrees to these terms. An employer can make a contract (w, e * ) with at most one employee. The employee who agrees to these terms receives the wage w and supplies an effort level e, which need not equal the contracted effort, e * . In effect, there is no penalty if the employee does not keep his promise, so the employee can choose any effort level, e ∈ [0.1, 1], with impunity. Although subjects may play this game several times, each employeremployee interaction is a one-shot (non-repeated) event.
If employees are self-interested, they will choose the zero-cost effort level, e = 0.1, no matter what wage is offered them. Knowing this, employers will never pay more than the minimum necessary to get the employee to accept a contract, which is 1 (assuming only integral wage offers are permitted). The employee will accept this offer, and will set e = 0.1. Since c(0.1) = 0, the employee's payoff is u = 1. The employer's payoff is π = 0.1 × 100 − 1 = 9.
In fact, however, this self-interested outcome rarely occurred in this experiment. 7 The average net payoff to employees was u = 35, and the higher the employer's choice of demanded effort, the more both employers and employee's earned. In effect, employers presumed the strong reciprocity predispositions of the employees, making more generous wage offers and receive higher effort, as a means of increasing both their own and the employee's payoff, as depicted in Figure 2 also shows that, though most employees are strong reciprocators, at any wage rate there still is a significant gap between the amount of effort agreed upon and the amount actually delivered. This is not because there are a few "bad apples" among the set of employees, because in fact, only 26% of employees delivered the level of effort they promised! We conclude that, according to this experiment, at least, even strong reciprocators are inclined to compromise their morality to some extent.
The above evidence is compatible with the notion that the employers were purely self-interested, since their beneficent behavior vis-á-vis their employees was effective in increasing employer profits. To see if employers were also strong reciprocators, following this round of experiments, the authors extended the game by allowing the employers to respond reciprocally to the actual effort choices of their workers. At a cost of 1, an employer could increase or decrease his employee's payoff by 2.5. If employers were self-interested, they would of course do neither, since they do not interact with the same worker a second time. However, 68% of the time, employers punished employees that did not fulfill their contracts, and 70% of the time, employers rewarded employees who overfulfilled their contracts. Indeed, employers rewarded 44% of employees who exactly fulfilled their contracts. Moreover, employees expected this behavior on the part of their employers, as shown by the fact that their effort levels increased significantly when their bosses gained the power to punish and reward them. Underfulfilled contracts dropped from 86% to 26% of the exchanges, and overfulfilled contracts rose from 3% to 38% of the total. Finally, allowing employers to reward and punish led to a 40% increase in the net payoffs to all subjects, even when the payoff reductions resulting from employer punishment of employees are taken into account.
We conclude from this study that the subjects who assume the role of "employee" conform to internalized standards of fairness and honesty, even when they are certain there are no material repercussions from behaving in a self-interested manner. Moreover, subjects who assume the role of "employer" expect this behavior and are rewarded for acting accordingly. Finally, "employers" draw upon the internalized norm of rewarding good and punishing bad behavior when they are permitted to punish, and "employees" expect this behavior and adjust their own effort levels accordingly.
Strong Reciprocity in the Public Goods Game
The public goods game is designed to illuminate such problems as the voluntary payment of taxes and contribution to team and community goals (Ledyard 1995) . The following is a common variant of the game. Ten subjects are told that $1 will be deposited in each of their "private accounts" as a reward for participating in each round of the experiment. For every $1 that a subject moves from his "private account" to the "public account," the experimenter will deposit one half dollar in the private accounts of each of the subjects at the end of the game. This process will be repeated ten times, and at the end the subjects can take home whatever they have in their private accounts.
If all ten subjects are perfectly cooperative, each puts $1 in the public account at the end of each round, generating a public pool of $10; the experimenter then puts $5 in the private account of each subject. After ten rounds of this, each subject has $50. However, every $1 a player contributes to the public account, while benefitting others by an amount $4.50, costs the contributor $0.50. Therefore the dominant strategy for a self-interested player is to contribute nothing to the pool. Each subject then earns just $10.
In fact, in public goods experiments, only a fraction of subjects conform to the self-interested actor model, contributing nothing to the public account. Rather, in a one-stage public goods game, people contribute on average about half of their private account. In the middle stages of the repeated game, however, contributions begin to decay, until at the end they are close to the self-interested actor level-i.e., zero.
Could we not explain the decay of public contribution by learning: the par-ticipants really do not understand the game at first, but once they hit upon the free-riding strategy, they apply it? One indication that learning does not account for the decay of cooperation is a result obtained by Andreoni (1988) . Andreoni finds that when the public goods game is played with several groups, but after every series of rounds group membership is reshuffled, after each reshuffling, subjects begin by contributing about half, but once again cooperation decays as the game progresses. Yet surely subjects did not "unlearn" the money-maximizing behavior between shuffles! Andreoni (1995) suggests a strong reciprocity explanation for the decay of cooperation: public-spirited contributors want to retaliate against free-riders, and the only way available to them in the game is by not contributing themselves. Subjects often report this reason for the unraveling of cooperation retrospectively. More compelling, however, is the fact that when subjects are given a more direct way of retaliating against defectors, they use it in a way that helps sustain cooperation (Dawes, Orbell, and Van de Kragt 1986 , Sato 1987 , Yamagishi 1988a , 1988b . These studies do not completely rule out the possibility that retaliation is strategic, however, since in the above studies, the subjects remained together for several rounds of play. Gächter (2000, 2002) remedied this defect, setting up a repeated public goods game with the possibility of costly retaliation, but they ensured that group composition changed in every period so subjects knew that costly retaliation could not confer any pecuniary benefit to those who punish. Nonetheless, punishment of free-riding was prevalent and gave rise to a large and sustainable increase in cooperation levels. Fehr and Gächter (2000) used six-and ten-round public goods game with groups of size four, and with costly punishment allowed at the end of each round, employing three different methods of assigning members to groups. They ran between 10 and 18 groups simultaneously. Under the Partner treatment, the four subjects remained in the same group for all ten periods. Under the Stranger treatment, the subjects were randomly reassigned after each round. Finally, under the Perfect Stranger treatment the subjects were randomly reassigned and assured that they would never meet the same subject more than once. Subjects earned an average of about $35 for an experimental session.
Fehr and Gächter ran the experiment for ten rounds with punishment and ten rounds without. Their results are illustrated in Figure 3 . We see that when costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not deteriorate, and in the Partner treatment, despite strict anonymity, cooperation increases almost to full cooperation, even on the final round. When punishment is not permitted, however, the same subjects experience the deterioration of cooperation found in previous public goods games. (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) .
The Ultimatum Game
In the ultimatum game, under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown a sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the "proposer," is instructed to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second player, who is called the "responder." The responder, again under conditions of anonymity, can either accept the offer or reject it. If the responder accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. If the responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. Since the game is played only once and the players do not know each other's identity, a self-interested responder will accept any positive amount of money. Knowing this, a self-interested proposer will offer the minimum possible amount, $1, and this will be accepted. However, when actually played, the self-interested outcome is almost never attained or even approximated. In fact, as many replications of this experiment have documented, under varying conditions and with varying amounts of money, proposers routinely offer respondents very substantial amounts, 50% of the total generally being the modal offer. Respondents frequently reject offers below 30% (Gintis 2000a) .
Economists were at first astonished at this behavior. Why would people reject a positive amount of money? They suggested that perhaps players did not understand the game. But by changing the rules a bit, experimenters showed that this was not the case. For instance, if the game is changed so that the offer is generated by a computer (and the responder is told this fact), the rejection rate becomes very low, however small a share is offered to the responder (Blount 1995) . Similarly, if the game is changed so that if the responder rejects the proposer's offer, he receives zero payoff, but the proposer still receives the share he proposed for himself, responders almost never rejected offers.
The ultimatum game reveals strong reciprocity on the part of the respondent, since the game is not repeated, and since the respondent's rejection of low offers is contingent upon the proposer having acted unfairly, and upon being able to punish the proposer. Moreover, to the extent that proposers make offers that are larger than necessary to induce assent on the part of the respondent, proposers also exhibit strong reciprocity in the form of a predisposition to cooperate.
The Cultural Variability of Cooperative Behavior
How generalizable are these results? Most ultimatum game experiments use college students as subjects. The fact that the results are similar around the world could either be because strong reciprocity is a uniformly expressed human behavior, or because college students have very similar cultures around the world. If the latter, which economic and social conditions are involved? Is strong reciprocity better explained statistically by individual attributes such as sex, age, or wealth, or by the attributes of the group to which the individuals belong? Are there cultures that approximate the self-interested actor of standard economics and biology?
To answer these questions, I and a group of colleagues undertook a large crosscultural study of behavior in ultimatum and public goods games (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis and McElreath 2001) . Twelve experienced anthropological field researchers, working in twelve countries on four continents, recruited subjects from fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. These societies consisted of three foraging groups (the Hadza of East Africa, the Au and Gnau of Papua New Guinea, and the Lamalera of Indonesia), six slash-and-burn horticulturists (the Aché, Machiguenga, Quichua, and Achuar of South America, and the Tsimané and Orma of East Africa), four nomadic herding groups (the Turguud, Mongols, and Kazakhs of Central Asia, and the Sangu of East Africa) and two sedentary, small-scale agricultural societies (the Mapuche of South America and Zimbabwe farmers in Africa)
The results of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the self-interested actor model is not supported in any society studied. Second, there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous crosscultural research and the self-interested actor model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion (more than 60%) of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in production, the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies.
To illustrate this fifth point, which is critical for our argument, consider two Papua New Guinea groups, the Au and the Gnau. These groups are neighboring forager-horticulturalists who have a culture of competitive gift-giving. In the ultimatum game, about one fifth of proposers made hyperfair offers of 60% or more of the pie to responders. Moreover, nearly half of the hyper-fair offers were rejected by responders! These results, never before seen in ultimatum game experiments, reflect the everyday life experience of self-aggrandizement through making generous offers, and self-abasement by accepting such offers.
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While much more research must be done before anything conclusive can be drawn from such studies, we can tentatively suggest that strong reciprocity is a virtually universal behavioral template, but that its expression is strongly affected by the culture of the particular society in which it is expressed. This remains true, moreover, even in contexts of anonymity and non-repeatedness that strongly favor the expression of self-interested behaviors. There is no question but that subjects fully understood the nature of the game they were playing, since each was tested on understanding before being permitted to participate. Therefore the fact that they made generous offers or rejected ungenerous offers (or in the case of the Au and the Gnau, rejected even generous offers), and did so broadly in conformance with the norms and practices of the societies in which they live, is a strong vindication of the sociological model of the internalization of norms: individuals maximize an preference function that includes, in addition to material payoffs, the norms of fairness prevalent in their societies.
A Model of Cultural Evolution
Consider a group in which members can either adopt, or fail to adopt, a certain cultural norm A. We shall call those who adopt norm A altruists, and we call those who do not adopt norm A self-interested types, or "B-types." Altruism is costly, in that self-interested types have fitness 1, as compared with altruists, whose have fitness 1 − s, where 0 < s < 1. 9 We assume in each period that agents pair off randomly, mate, and have offspring in proportion to their fitness, after which they die (we call this a biologically adaptive dynamic). Families pass on their cultural norms to their offspring, so offspring of AA parents are altruists, offspring of BB parents are self-interested, and half of the offspring of AB-families are altruists, the other half self-interested (we call this vertical transmission). We also assume that the self-interested offspring of AB-and BB-families are susceptible to influence by community institutions promoting altruistic norms, a fraction of such offspring becoming altruists (we call this oblique transmission).
For the first stage, suppose there are n males and n females at the beginning of the period. If the fraction of altruists is α, there will be nα 2 AA-families, who will have nα 2 (1 − s) 2 β offspring, all of whom are altruists, where we choose β so that population grows at some rate g(α), depending on the degree of prosociality of norm A. There will also be 2nα(1 − α) AB-families, who will have 2nα(1 − α)(1 − s)β offspring, half of whom are altruists. Finally there will be n(1 − α) 2 BB-families who will have n(1 − α) 2 β offspring. Adding up the number of offspring, we see that we must have β = g(α)/(1 − sα) 2 . Thus the frequencies of AA, AB, and BB offspring are given by
Second, a fraction αγ of offspring of AB-and BB-families who are selfinterested switch to being altruists under the influence of the oblique transmission of cultural norm A, where γ is a measure of the strength of the oblique transmission process. Note that we have made the conservative assumption that oblique transmission is proportional to the level of altruism. It is easy to check that the change in the fraction of altruists in the next generation is given bẏ
Third, each group member i observes the fitness and the type of a randomly chosen other member j , and changes to j 's type if j 's fitness is higher. However, information concerning the difference in fitnesses of the two strategies is imperfect, and agents' preference functions do not perfectly track fitness, so it is reasonable to assume that the larger the difference in the payoffs, the more likely the agent is to perceive it, and change. Specifically, we assume the probability p that an agent using A will shift to B is proportional to the fitness difference of the two types, so p = σ s for some proportionality constant σ > 0.
The expected fraction α of the population using A after the above shifts is then given by
This is a special case of the replicator dynamic in cultural evolution. 10 We now combine these two sources of change in the fraction of altruists, givinġ
where σ now represents the relative strength of the replicator dynamic, which is biased against the altruistic norm, in comparison with the cultural transmission mechanisms, which may favor this norm. In reduced form, we now havė
We call the situationα = 0, α ∈ [0, 1] a cultural equilibrium of the dynamical system. We then have Theorem 1. We assume γ ≥ 0 is given and fixed throughout.
α = 1 is a globally stable altruistic equilibrium.
(b) If
both α = 0 and α = 1 are locally stable equilibria of the system and there is third unstable equilibrium α * ∈ (0, 1) separating the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria: both self-interested and altruistic equilibria are stable. Proof: If γ = 0, then s max = 0, so s > s max . By Theorem 6, α = 0 is the only stable cultural equilibrium. Theorem 6 shows that the higher the personal cost of altruistic behavior, the more stringent the conditions under which altruism will emerge. This result illustrates the power of a theory that models the tension between prosocial socialization institutions and the psychological mechanism of norm internalization on the one hand, and the replicator dynamic that induces agents to shift to higher payoff behaviors, whatever the effect of these behaviors on others, and on society as a whole, on the other hand. This tension is also revealed in the following: − s) , the self-interested cultural equilibrium is globally stable.
Maintaining Cooperation Through Altruistic Punishment
A group of n individuals plays a public goods game in which each member can either cooperate or defect. Defecting costs nothing, but adds nothing to the payoffs of the other members. Cooperating costs c > 0, but contributes an amount b > c shared equally by the other members. In a one-shot encounter, the only Nash equilibrium is universal defection. By using either group selection (Gintis 2000b , Henrich and Boyd 2001 , Bowles 2001 , Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson 2003 or repeated interactions with a suitably low rate of discounting future benefits (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986 , Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989 , Bowles and Gintis 1998 , Nowak and Sigmund 1998 , a high level of cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium. We here show cooperation can also be maintained in our framework without the need for group selection or repeated interactions, and even when c is very large. Let A be an altruistic trait that induces its bearer to cooperate in the public goods game, while trait B induces its bearer to defect. The fitness deficit of altruistic trait is now s = c, so Theorem 1 implies that if
complete cooperation in the Public Goods Game is a stable cultural equilibrium. If, this inequality fails but
full cooperation remains a stable equilibrium, but there is another stable equilibrium with complete defection. If (9) fails, cooperation cannot be sustained.
The model in its current form is unrealistic, however, in that most social groups that rely on cooperation have forms of punishment of defectors that considerably reduce the need for altruism and increase the range of parameters over which high levels of cooperation can be maintained.
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Suppose that by bearing a cost w > 0, an agent can inflict a punishment c p > 0 on a defector. Suppose now B-type individuals are self-interested, while A-type individuals are strong reciprocators: they cooperate unconditionally and punish defectors, provided the threat of punishment leads self-interested types to cooperate. If punishment cannot deter defectors, then strong reciprocators neither cooperate nor punish.
Suppose that while defectors are always detected, a certain fraction β > 0 of cooperators accidentally defect, or appear to defect. If α is the fraction of strong reciprocators, n(1 − α) individuals defect, and nαβ cooperate but are treated as defectors. The total number of 'violators'to be punished is then n (1−α(1−β) ). The total harm inflicted on real and perceived defectors is nαc p , so the harm per defector imposed by strong reciprocators is αc p / (1 − α(1 − β) ). The cost of cooperating in the one-shot game is now c + βαc p / (1 − α(1 − β) ), while the cost of defecting is αc p / (1 − α(1 − β) ). The net gain from defecting is αc p (1 − β)/ (1 − α(1 − β) ) − c, so full cooperation is a Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game if
If α < α min , punishment will not deter defectors, so strong reciprocators will neither punish nor cooperate, and universal defection will obtain. The cost of cooperation is now frequency-dependent, with
The dynamics of the system are now given bẏ
but now for α < α min we have
while for α ≥ α min , h(α) is given by (5) with s = w(1 − (1 − β) n−1 ). We cannot use Theorem 1 to analyze the behavior of this cultural system, since s is now frequency dependent. However, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the fraction α of strong reciprocators obeys (12), then
is necessary and sufficient for there to be a locally stable full cooperation equilibrium. Moreover, assuming (14) , the following holds. 
Proof: Note first that when s = 0, h(α) > 0 for α ∈ [0, 1). Therefore the fraction of strong reciprocators increases for α < α min . To prove (a) and (b), we note that the same argument as in Theorem 1 shows that the equilibrium α = 1 is locally stable for s = w(1 − (1 − β) n−1 ) < s max , where s max is given by (7). It is easy to check that this condition is equivalent to γ > s (1 + σ (1 − s) ). But this condition is implied by the inequality assumption on γ . As in Theorem 1, h(α) has a zero at
Hence if this inequality holds, then there is an unstable equilibrium at α * which implies h(α) < 0 to the left of α = α min , so this equilibrium is also stable. If the opposite inequality holds for γ , then α = 1 is globally stable. To prove part c, note that α = 1 is unstable in this case. Moreover, α * < α min leads to a contradiction, since this inequality implies γ > s(1
, which violates the assumption of (c). Hence α * > α min must be a stable equilibrium, in which case it is also globally stable, since an equilibrium at α min must be unstable.
The argument surrounding (8) and (9) implies that if the cost c of contributing to the public good is sufficiently high, cooperation will not take place in a large group, however great the benefits of cooperation. Theorem 2 shows the power of altruistic punishment and the contribution of strong reciprocity to maintaining cooperation in such a situation. As long as (14) holds (which will be the case under a great range of parameter values even when (8) fails), there is a full cooperation equilibrium with a positive level of strong reciprocity. Moreover, we expect c p to be large, since humans are unique among species that live in groups and recognizing individuals, in their capacity to inflicting heavy punishment at low cost to the punisher (Bingham 1999) , as a result of their superior tool-making and hunting ability (Goodall 1964 , Plooij 1978 , Darlington 1975 , Fifer 1987 , Isaac 1987 .
Cultural Dynamics when Payoffs are Frequency Dependent
If the payoffs to A and B are frequency dependent, as would be the case if they represented strategies in a noncooperative game, then we will have in general the functional relationship s = s(α). A specific case of such a functional relationship was presented in the previous section. While we could extend Theorem 1 broadly to this new situation, we will deal with only partial results. We have For an interesting example of frequency dependent cultural equilibrium, suppose in each period members of the population pair off randomly and play a hawk-dove game as follows. The two players must share a resource whose value is 2. The 'dove' strategy is to share equally, so when two doves meet, each receives a payoff of 1. The 'hawk' strategy is to try to steal the whole resource. When a hawk meets a dove, the hawk takes everything, so has payoff 2, while the dove has payoff 0. When two hawks meet, however, they fight, one (randomly) gets the resource, but each faces an expected net cost (due to energy and injury losses) a > 0. It is easy to show that there is a unique, evolutionary stable, equilibrium to this game in which the frequency of doves is α * = a/(1 + a), and the expected payoff to all players is π * = a/(1 + a). We treat the dove strategy as altruistic, because switching from the hawk to the dove strategy will increase the payoff of all the player's partners, although at a cost to the player himself, if there is a greater than equilibrium fraction of doves.
Suppose the dove norm is culturally transmitted, as in the previous models. If the fraction of doves is α, the expected payoff to a dove is α, and the expected payoff to a hawk is 2α − a(1 − α), so the loss associated with being a dove is s(α) = α(1 + a) − a. The expression for h(α) is quite complicated in this case, but we do have the following theorem. 
Proof: We have
Thus h(α) must have a positive-to-negative crossing in the interval (a/(1 + a), 1), which is then a locally stable equilibrium. Since this has a greater than equilibrium fraction of doves, all agents have higher payoffs that in the self-interested equilibrium.
Cultural Dynamics when Payoffs do not Affect Fitness
In all models to this point we have treated the payoffs to cultural traits as biological fitness. If we assume payoffs represent the subjective preferences of agents rather than their biological fitness, s can be negative as well as positive, and we must then replace (1) with
In this case the equation of motion becomeṡ Proof: The zeros of h(α) are α = 0, 1, sσ/γ , and the last lies in the unit interval when 0 < sσ < γ . We also have h (α) = −3α 2 − sσ + 2α(γ + sσ ), which must be negative for a stable equilibrium. Evaluating this expression at the zeros of h(α) verifies the statements in the theorem.
If the cost of altruism, s, is frequency dependent, the behavior of the system is more interesting. Consider, for example, the hawk-dove game described in the previous section. Now α is governed bẏ
and we have the following theorem. Proof: In this case h(α) has zeros α = 0, 1 , and aσ/(σ (1
Evaluating this expression at the three equilibria gives the asserted results.
A Explanation of Norm Internalization
Why do we have the generalized capacity to internalize norms? Integrating sociology, economics, and biology to explain altruism will not be effective unless this question is answered, because the concept of internalization sits uneasily with both the economist's model of the self-interested rational actor, and the biologist's requirement that the concept be evolutionarily grounded. The capacity to internalize is certainly curious, something akin to the capacity of a digital computer to be programmed, albeit only within certain strict limits. From a biological standpoint, internalization may be an elaboration of imprinting and imitation mechanisms found in several species of birds and mammals, but its highly developed form in humans indicates it probably had great adaptive value during our evolutionary emergence as a species. Moreover, from an economic standpoint, the everyday observation that people who exhibit a strongly internalized moral codes lead happier and more fulfilled lives than those who subject all actions to a narrow calculation of personal costs and benefits of norm compliance, suggests it might not be 'rational' to be self-interested.
A related paper, Gintis (2003) , shows that if internalization of some norms is personally fitness enhancing (e.g., preparing for the future, having good personal hygiene, positive work habits, and/or control of emotions), then genes promoting the capacity to internalize can evolve. Given this genetic capacity, we have seen above, altruistic norms will be internalized as well, provided their fitness costs are not excessive. In effect, altruism 'hitchhikes' on the personal fitness-enhancing capacity of norm internalization.
12 Altruistic behavior, then, is an exaption, in the sense of Gould and Vrba (1981) .
But, why should the internalization of any norms be individually fitness-enhancing? The following is a possible explanation, based on the observation that internalization alters the agents goals, whereas instrumental and conventional cultural forms merely aid the individual in attaining pre-given goals. In humans, as much as in other species, these goals are related to, but not reducible to, biological fitness.
Biological fitness is a theoretical abstraction unknown to virtually every reallife organism. Organisms therefore do not, in any circumstance, literally maximize fitness. Rather, organisms have a relatively simple state-dependent preference function that is itself subject to selection according to its ability to promote individual fitness (Alcock 1993) . In a slowly-changing environment, this preference function will track fitness closely. In a rapidly changing environment, however, natural selection will be too slow, and the preference function will not track fitness well.
The development of cultural transmission, in the form of instrumental techniques and conventions, and the ensuing increase in social complexity of hominid society, doubtless produced such a rapidly changing environment, thus conferring high fitness value on the development of a non-genetic mechanism for altering the agent's preference function. Internalization is adaptive because it allows the human preference function to shift in directions conducive to higher personal fitness. The internalization of norms is thus adaptive because it facilitates the transformation of drives, needs, desires, and pleasures (arguments in the human preference function) into forms that are more closely aligned with fitness maximization. Internalization is limited to our species, moreover because no other species places such great emphasis on cultural transmission.
We humans thus have a 'primordial' preference function that does not well serve our fitness interests, and which is more or less successfully 'overridden' by our internalized norms. This primordial preference function knows nothing of 'thinking ahead,' but rather satisfies immediate desires. Lying, cheating, killing, stealing, and satisfying short-term bodily needs (wrath, lust, greed, gluttony, sloth) are all actions that produce immediate pleasure and drive-reduction, at the expense of our overall well-being in the long run. This fact explains the congenital weakness of human nature in its tendency to succumb to the unruly temptations of the flesh.
This evolutionary argument is meant to apply to the long period in the Pleistocene during which the human character was formed. Social change since the agricultural revolution some 10,000 years ago has been far too swift to permit even the internalization of norms to produce a close fit between preference and fitness. Indeed, with the advent of modern societies, the internalization of norms has been systematically diverted from fitness (expected number of offspring) to welfare (net degree of contentment) maximization. This, of course, is precisely what we would expect when humans obtain control over the content of ethical norms. Indeed, this misfit between welfare and fitness is doubtless a necessary precondition for civilization and a high level of per capita income. This is true because, were we fitness maximizers, every technical advance would have been accompanied by an equivalent increase in the rate of population growth, thus nullifying its contribution to human welfare, as predicted long ago by Thomas Malthus. The demographic transition, which has led to dramatically reduced human birth rates throughout most of the world, is a testimonial to the gap between welfare and fitness. Perhaps the most important form of prosocial cultural transmission in the world today is the norm of having few, but high quality, offspring.
Conclusion
Economics and biology offer a wealth of powerful analytical tools for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction. But, the key to solving the puzzle of prosociality comes from a very venerable branch of sociology: socialization theory, and more specifically, the theory of internalization of norms, first stressed by Durkheim (the quote is from Suicide):
The influence of society is what had roused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions.
Biologists, who are most comfortable with models of Darwinian competition, and economists, who are no less at home with models of market competition, have ignored this phenomenon, doubtless because individuals who internalize norms that reduce their fitness (biology) or material rewards (economics) should be outcompeted by others who are immune to society's psychological manipulations.
This paper shows that the internalization of norms is compatible with the economist's concept of rational action and copying the successful behavior of others (the replicator dynamic), as well as the biologist's treatment of adaptive dynamics and cultural transmission. When appropriately combined, they solve the problem of prosociality.
